THE NEED FOR ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
TAILORED TO THE SPECIFIC
CONCERNS OF BANK-NONBANK
DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS
The United States Supreme Court will soon decide whether

section 8 of the Clayton Act' prohibits director interlocks 2 between a
bank and a competing nonbanking entity. Prior to United States v.
Crocker National Corp. ,3 the decision under review by the Court, the
"other than banks" language of the Clayton Act 4 had generally been

interpreted as exempting interlocking directorates between banks and
nonbanks, regardless of the competition between them, from the Act's
general prohibition of interlocks. 5 In Crocker, however, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the language to mean that 6the

interlock prohibition applies unless all the corporations are banks.

The Crocker case involved several large banks and insurance

companies, 7 and, if affirmed, promises to have a significant effect on the
makeup of boards of directors of banks and insurance companies. At
the time of the district court decision in Crocker, forty percent of the

insurance company directors in America were bank directors as well. 8
The Crocker decision is also important because its reasoning may
invalidate all interlocking directorates between banks and companies

outside the insurance field with which banks compete, 9 as well as the

1. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
2. A director interlock exists when two or more corporations have a common individual on
their boards of directors.
3. 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub nom. Bankamerica Corp. v. United States,
102 S.Ct. 2294 (1982).
4. The language of the Clayton Act at issue is contained in the fourth unnumbered
paragraph of section 8:
[N]o person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any
one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than
$1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other than banks, banking associations, trust companies, and common carriers. . . if such corporations are or shall have
been theretofore, by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so
that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (emphasis added).
5. See infra notes 36-39, 73-77 and accompanying text.
6. 656 F.2d at 434.
7. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
8. United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 691 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
9. An increasing variety of industries are now competing with banks in the credit market.
Sears, Roebuck & Company, the nation's largest retailer, has recently diversified and is offering a
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director interlocks between banks and insurance companies which were
involved in the case.

This note examines the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
Clayton Act. It determines that applying section 8 to a director

interlock between a bank and a competing nonbanking entity is not
supported by the statutory language, the legislative history, or the

underlying policy goals of the Act. For this reason, the Supreme Court
should overturn the Ninth Circuit decision. Even though such a
decision would not immunize bank-nonbank relationships from

antitrust control,' 0 the note recommends new congressional action in
the area of bank-nonbank director interlocks.

Banks and other

companies such as insurance companies compete in many markets;
Congress did not foresee such competition when it passed the Clayton

Act or the other major antitrust acts."

Implementation of new

legislation is preferable to judicial action since Congress could pass a
2
statute tailored to the specific concerns of bank-nonbank interlocks.'

I.

THE CLAYTON

ACT

AND THE CROCKER DECISION

The Clayton Act specifically proscribes certain interlocking direc-

torates.' 3 Interlocks may be the source of several economic problems.
For example, interlocking directors may dictate discriminatory treatment in the supply of materials and credit. '4 Interlocks may give rise to

conflicts of interest when competing corporations are served by a common director.' 5 The interlocks create conduits for the exchange of invariety of financial services. If the Crocker decision stands, industry lawyers believe the holding
could be applied to an interlocking directorate between a bank and an oil company that issues
credit cards. Ruling Would Cut Insurers' Link to Banks, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1981, at 29, col. 3.
10. Both the FTC Act and the Sherman Act could be used to attack such interlocks. See 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976). Banks are specifically exempted
from the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); however, the Justice Department may use the FTC Act
to attack interlocks by bringing suit against the nonbank. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying

text.
The lower court in Crocker specifically refused to comment on whether the FTC Act or the
Sherman Act could be used to attack bank-nonbank interlocks. See 422 F. Supp. at 730 n.23.
11. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
12. The note proposes that Congress pass a statute with a "grandfather" provision-a statute
which sanctions existing interlocks for several years, see infra note 121-to avoid the disruption
that challenges to the numerous interlocking directorships could cause. See supra notes 7-9 and
accompanying text.
13. S.REp. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
14. Travers, Interlocks in CorporateManagement and the Antitrust Laws, 46 TEx. L. REv.
819, 832-33 (1968).
15. The conflict arises from the director's access to competitive information including price
information. The exchange of price information can be a violation of the Sherman Act. United
States v. ContainerCorp. ofAm., 393 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1969). Therefore, the director faces the
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formation 16 and may result in ineffective management by
overburdened directors.' 7 Finally, interlocks raise the "fear that so
much power will be concentrated in so few hands as to be a threat to a
8
free society."'
A. Background andPurpose of the Clayton Act.

The interlocking directorate was a common characteristic of
American industry at the turn of the century. 19 Two congressional in-

vestigations 20 and a series of writings by Louis Brandeis 2 ' provided the
impetus for the inclusion of interlock provisions in the Clayton Act.
President Woodrow Wilson called for legislation prohibiting both vertical 22 and horizontal 23 director interlocks in a message before Congress on January 20, 1914.24 Despite Wilson's specific reference to
dilemma of being privy to certain information concerning the corporations with which he is associated that the other corporations would like to know, but which he cannot divulge.
16. J. JURAN & J. LOUDER, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR 305 (1966); Johnson, Interlocking
Directorates-A Government View, in RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS & LIABILITIES FOR
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 8 (1976).
17. Louis Brandeis noted this problem in his eloquent attack on the corporate interlock:
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws
human and divine. Applied to rival corporations, it tends to the suppression of competition and to violation of the Sherman law. Applied to corporations which deal with each
other, it tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can
serve two masters. In either event, it tends to inefficiency; for it removes incentive and
destroys soundness of judgment.
L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 35 (1933).
18. Travers, supra note 14, at 833. If several groups have power, no one group may act in an
arbitrary or capricious manner without another, equally powerful group taking corrective measures. This reasoning underlies the antitrust laws. Market power in many hands is a check on the
ability of any one entity to act "unfairly" because the consumer may always turn to another entity
that will treat him "fairly."
19.

HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF

CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R.REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913) (Report of the
Pujo Committee).
20. Id.; HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTIGATION OF UNITED STATES
STEEL CORP.,H.R. REP. No. 1127, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) (Report of the Stanley Committee).
21. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1933); Brandeis, Breaking the Money Tust,
Harper's Weekly, Nov. 22, 1913-Jan. 17, 1914.
22. A vertical director interlock is an interlock between companies situated in a suppliercustomer relationship. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
23. A horizontal director interlock is an interlock between companies performing similar
functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or services. See id at 334.
24. Wilson said:
[Laws are needed to] effectually prohibit and prevent such interlockings of the personnel
of the directorates of great corporations-banks and railroads, industrial, commercial,
and public-service bodies-as in effect result in making those who borrow and those who
lend practically one and the same, those who sell and those who buy but the same persons trading with one another under different names and in different combinations [vertical relationships], and those who affect to compete in fact partners and masters of some
whole field of business [horizontal relationships].
S. REP.No. 698, supra note 13 (emphasis in original).
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vertical interlocks and his express concern with the above problems, 2 5

Congress responded in a narrow fashion to the broad subject of interlocks. In the Clayton Act, Congress prohibited only horizontal interlocks, 26 and alleviated only the impairment-of-competition problem,

27
without addressing problems relating to size and director behavior.

Thus, Congress limited the scope and coverage of the statute within the

wider context of the general interlock problem.
B.

The Crocker Decision.

The particular provision of section 8 at issue in Crocker, the fourth
paragraph of section 8, is generally known as the "industrial corpora-

tions provision." 28 It contains four limiting clauses that must be satisfied to invoke the interlock prohibition. 2 9 First, two or more

corporations may not share a director if any one of the corporations has
capital, surplus, and undivided profits in excess of $1,000,000. Second,
the corporations must be engaged in interstate commerce. 30 The final

clause requires that the corporations be competitors so that elimination
of competition by agreement between them would violate another anti-

trust law. The third clause, phrased as an exception, is the problem
clause. It exempts banks, banking associations, trust companies, and

common carriers from the purview of the statute. Directorates prohib3
ited by section 8 are per se illegal. '
25. Id.
26. The language in the statute reads "if such corporations are or shall have been theretofore,
15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors.
This describes a horizontal relationship. See supra note 23.
The Clayton Act does have'a provision, section 10, dealing with vertical interlocks. This
section deals specifically with common carriers and is merely regulatory; vertical director interlocks are not proscribed. 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976).
27. The purpose of the Act was "to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies
in their incipiency and before consummation." S. REP. No. 698, supra note 13, at 1.
28. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 5, United States v. Crocker Nat'l
Corp., 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub nonz. Bankamerica Corp. v. United States,
102 S.Ct. 2294 (1982). For the text of the provision see supra note 4.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
30. This requirement is less of a problem today than at the time the Clayton Act was being
formulated-a time when the reach of the commerce clause was uncertain. Sixty years prior to the
passage of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court held that banking was not commerce. See Nathan
v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73 (1850). Therefore, the Congress that formulated the Clayton
Act would not have believed banks were subject to Congress's commerce clause power. See
Crocker, 422 F. Supp. at 701. Banks now can be regulated under the commerce clause. See
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 336 n.12 (1963).
31. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Sears
provided the first judicial construction of section 8. Less than one month after this decision, the
Supreme Court decided a case dealing with section 8, but did not address the question whether the
proper standard of review was a per se rule or a rule of reason. See United States v. W.T. Grant
Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953). Sears has been followed uniformly. See Crocker 656 F.2d at 438; TRW,
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The interlocking directorates attacked in Crocker were held by five
individuals, and linked three of the nation's largest banks with four of
its largest insurance companies. 32 Only the scope of the bank exemption was at issue. The parties stipulated that the bank defendants and
insurance company defendants were competitors in certain mortgage
and real estate loans, and that an agreement between them to eliminate
competition would be an antitrust violation. 33 Thus, the fourth requirement of the statute was satisfied. The defendants conceded that
two of the other requirements-having capital, surplus, and undivided
profits in excess of $1,000,000, and being engaged in interstate commerce-had also been satisfied. 34 Given the per se nature of a section 8
violation, 35 the defendants in effect admitted that they were not in compliance with the Act if the court interpreted the "other than banks"
exemption as applying only if all the corporations involved are banks.
1. The Statutory Language. The district court in the Crocker
case applied a parallel construction analysis to the language of the industrial corporations paragraph of section 8, and found it "readily apparent" that the four clauses of the paragraph 36 "apply to both
corporations involved in an interlock, except for the first clause which
by its own specific terms may be satisfied by 'any one of' the two interlocked corporations. '37 The district court noted that the statutory language requires that all interlocked corporations satisfy both the second
requirement dealing with interstate commerce and the fourth requirement of a possible impairment of competition. 3 As evidenced by the
statutory language of the first "$1 million" clause, Congress was explicit when restricting application of an element to just one of the parties. No such explicit restriction appears in the language of the "other
than banks" exception. Accordingly, the district court held that a parInc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 1981); Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 589
(7th Cir. 1973).

32. 656 F.2d at 433. A director of Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association,
the nation's largest bank, sat on the board of Prudential Insurance Company. A director of Bankers Trust Company also sat on Prudential's board. Three individuals were directors of Crocker
National Bank and of either the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, or Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York. Id. at 433 n.2.
The potential competition between these concerns was substantial. At the beginning of 1975,
the three banks had outstanding real estate loans of $6.5 billion; the four insurance companies had
outstanding real estate loans of $32 billion. Id. at 433.
33. 1d.

34. 422 F. Supp. at 688.
35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.

37. 422 F. Supp. at 690.
38. Id.
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allel construction of the language required that all corporations satisfy
the third clause. Therefore, all corporations which are interlocked

and
must be other than banks, banking associations, trust companies,
39
common carriers for the interlock prohibition to apply.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court

interpreted the "other than banks" provision as relating back to the
immediately preceding paragraphs regulating interlocks between
banks.40 The court reasoned that because the banking paragraphs ap-

ply only to interlocks between banks, only interlocking directorates between banks governed by the banking paragraphs are excluded from
41
the industrial corporations provision.
Thus, the district court and the court of appeals interpreted the
vague language of the statute in different ways, neither of which is
clearly correct. The district court interpretation, however, seems to be
the more logical interpretation because the Ninth Circuit's interpretation does not account for all the language of the statute. The statute
reads "no person at the same time shall be a director in any two or
more corporations . . . other than banks, banking associations, trust
companies, and common carriers .... -42 Under the Ninth Circuit's

construction, only interlocks between common carriers governed by the
common carrier provision, section 10,43 should be excluded from the
39. Id. at 686; Brief of Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, supra note 28, at 6.
40. 656 F.2d at 434. A part of the "banking" paragraphs is set forth below:
[Para 1]
No private banker or director, officer, or employee of any member bank of the Federal Reserve System or any branch thereof shall be at the same time a director, officer, or
employee of any other bank, banking association, savings bank, or trust company organized under the National Bank Act or organized under the laws of any State or of the
District of Columbia, or any branch thereof, except that the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System may by regulation permit such service as a director, officer, or
employee of not more than one other such institution or branch thereof; but the foregoing prohibition shall not apply in the case of any one or more of the following or any
branch thereof....
15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). The Act then lists seven exceptions to the general prohibition that are not
relevant here.
The Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3207 (Supp. IV
1980), has been enacted since the institution of the Crocker proceedings. See infra note 95. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System considers the first three paragraphs of section
8, the banking paragraphs set forth above, to have been supplanted by this Act. Management
Official Interlocks, 12 C.F.R. § 212.7 (1981).
41. 656 F.2d at 434. This interpretation of the language is not unique. It was also espoused
by an administrative law judge in a Federal Trade Commission proceeding. In re Perpetual Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608, 636-37 (1977), vacated on othergrounds, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979).
Perpetualis discussed more fully at infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (emphasis added).
43. Section 10 is set forth below:
No common carrier engaged in commerce shall have any dealings in securities, supplies, or other articles of commerce, or shall make or have any contracts for construction
or maintenance of any kind, to the amount of more than $50,000, in the aggregate, in any
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industrial corporations paragraph. The common carrier provision,
however, regulates vertical relationships while the industrial corporations paragraph regulates horizontal relationships. If "other than common carriers"' excludes only those vertical interlocks regulated in

section 10, horizontal interlocks between common carriers are not removed from section 8's prohibitions by this language. It is not necessary to exclude the interlocks regulated by section 10 from the section 8
provision, because the two sections do not purport to regulate the same
type of interlock. If the entire "other than" phrase is interpreted con-

sistently with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the inclusion of "other
than common carriers" has no effect. 44
2.

The Purpose andPolicy of the Act. After noting that the lan-

guage of the act was neither "clear" nor "unequivocal," 45 the Ninth
one year, with another corporation, firm, partnership, or association when the said common carrier shall have upon its board of directors or as its president, manager, or as its
purchasing or selling officer, or agent in the particular transaction, any person who is at
the same time a director, manager, or purchasing or selling officer of, or who has any
substantial interest in, such other corporation, firm, partnership, or association, unless
and except such purchases shall be made from, or such dealings shall be with, the bidder
whose bid is the most favorable to such common carrier, to be ascertained by competitive bidding under regulations to be prescribed by rule or otherwise by the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976).
44. The Crocker court noted the possible inconsistency between the common carrier provision, section 10, and the industrial corporation paragraph of section 8, but did not attempt to
reconcile the two sections other than to say that Congress chose to deal with banks and common
carriers differently. 656 F.2d at 443.
A possible interpretation that is somewhat consistent with the Crocker decision is that the
"other than" provision means other than horizontal bank interlocks regulated in the first three
paragraphs and other than horizontal common carrier interlocks regulated outside the Clayton
Act. This is the position the government took in Crocker. "The bank exception was added to
avoid inconsistent regulation of bank-bank interlocks regulated elsewhere in section 8. The common carrier exception was designed to exempt interlocks between common carriers from regulation because the Interstate Commerce Act had provided adequate safeguards against abuses by
those carriers." Brief for the United States at 29, United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d
428 (9th Cir. 1981), cer. grantedsub nonL Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 2294
(1982).
Horizontal interlocks between common carriers are regulated elsewhere. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 11322 (Supp. IV 1980) (replacing section 20a(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 20a(12), which was repealed in 1978). Such interlocks were not, however, regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act until 1920, six years after the Clayton Act was enacted. The framers of the
Clayton Act, in drafting the "other than common carriers" phrase, could not possibly have relied
on a horizontal interlock provision in the Interstate Commerce Act that had not yet come into
existence.
Additionally, this construction requires reference not only to other provisions of the Clayton
Act, but also to all other statutory provisions, none specifically mentioned in the Act, which may
govern interlocks. While consistent with the court's decision in Crocker, this interpretation of the
statutory language is "both strained and curious." See Brief of Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, supra note 28, at 6.
45. 656 F.2d at 435.
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Circuit examined the purpose and policy of the Act to determine its
meaning. The court relied on the "prophylactic purpose" 4 6 of the Act
to decide that the Act should be construed to prohibit bank-nonbank

director interlocks. In its analysis, the court focused on Congress' recognition of "the evil of interlocking directorates" 47 and Congress' de-

sire to strengthen the Sherman Act. 48 The court also examined cases

construing the antitrust laws, and noted that the laws should be "construed liberally," and that "'immunity from the antitrust laws is not

lightly implied.'

49

Although the general observations of the court are correct, the

court ignored the background of the Act itself.50 The Clayton Congress
sought to control anticompetitive relationships, 51 yet it excluded from
the Act's coverage several anticompetitive arrangements, such as management and vertical relationships.5 2 Management interlocks, as well
as director interlocks, have been criticized by Congress as a vehicle of

54
corporate concentration, 53 and concentration dampens competition.

A management interlock between a bank and a competing insurance

company could threaten the competitive integrity of the credit mar-

56
ket.55 Similarly, vertical interlocks are potentially anticompetive.

The Clayton Act, however, does not proscribe management or vertical
interlocks.5 7 A harm to competition is not the gravamen of a Clayton
Act violation.5 8 The Crocker court ignored this inherent limitation in
the nature of the Act.
46. Id. at 440.

47. Id. at 438.
48. Id. at 439.
49. Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted).
50. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
52. The industrial corporations paragraph applies to "competitors" [horizontal interlocks],
but does not address customer-supplier relationships [vertical interlocks]. The paragraph is limited also to prohibiting a person from serving as "a director" in two or more competing corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
53. See, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF COMM. OF JUDICIARY, 89TH
CONG., IST Snss., REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 15 (Comm. Print 1965)

(management interlocks); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. Part 3, 8 (1914) (director
interlocks).
54. See supra note 18.
55. The first three paragraphs of section 8 contain evidence of the Clayton Act framers' recognition of the anticompetitive aspect of management interlocks. These paragraphs proscribe director, officer and employee interlocks. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
56. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914).
57. See supra note 52.
58. There is no empirical evidence nor any judicial findings concerning the competitive effect
of bank-nonbank competitor interlocks. The anticipated effect of prohibiting such interlocks is
the removal of the danger that anticompetitive effects will result from the interlocking directorates. See Department of Justice Proposed Consent Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement:
United States v. Bankamerica Corp., 41 Fed. Reg. 19,678, 19,679 (1976); Department of Justice
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Thus, the court's reliance on the prophylactic purpose of the Clayton Act in finding bank-nonbank interlocks subject to section 8 was
improper. Specific inclusion by the statutory language, not anticompetitive effect, defines the scope of section 8.
C.

The Legislative History of the "other than banks" Exception.

Because the language of section 8 of the Clayton Act is unclear,
the legislative history of the Act should be examined to help define the

meaning of the "other than banks" clause.59 Unfortunately the legislative history contains only one specific reference to the "other than
banks" language as it would apply to bank-nonbank interlocks.
In a debate on the floor of the House of Representatives, Representative Mann stated that the "other than banks" clause appeared to

exempt bank-nonbank interlocks from the Act.60 Without the "other
than banks" language, Mann believed the proposed Act would regulate
these bank-nonbank interlocks. 6 ' Mann thus objected that the "other
than" clause, which was added by the conference committee, was a

substantive change to the draft of the Clayton Act, rather than a clarification. Mann argued that because the House and Senate had not dis-

agreed as to the industrial corporations paragraph, such a change
exceeded the authority of the conferees. The Speaker ruled against

Mann, 62 indicating that the Speaker did not regard the addition of the
"other than" clause as a substantive change in the proposed Clayton
Act. The Speaker, however, did not specifically address the issue of

whether bank-nonbank interlocks were governed by the new industrial
corporations provision.6 3
Proposed Consent Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement: United States v. Crocker Nat'?
Corp., 41 Fed. Reg. 3754, 3756 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917).
60. 51 CONG. REC. 16,272 (1914).
61. Mann believed that prior to the inclusion of the "other than" clause, section 8 prohibited
a bank director from also being a director in another company if there was some sort of competition between the corporations. Id. at 16,272-73.
62. Id at 16,273.
63. Id at 16,269-73. The Crocker court brushed aside this House debate because Representative Mann, who was questioning the meaning of the "other than banks" provision, was an opponent of the interpretation he espoused and the proponents of the statute were not given the
opportunity to respond. 656 F.2d at 445-46, 445 n.58. But whereas the Crocker court said Mann
first advanced the idea that the "other than banks" provision exempted interlocks between banks
and nonbanks on page 16,272, id. at 445 n.58, Mann actually first set out his position on page
16,269. "What the conferees have done [by adding "other than banks"] is to eliminate from [the
industrial corporations] section all banking corporations." 51 CONG. REc. 16,269. After this
statement, the proponents had the opportunity to respond, and did respond prior to the termina-
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This inconclusive House debate is perhaps more important for the
insight furnished by another congressman. Representative Sherley in-

dicated that because banks did not compete with industrial corporations they could not be controlled by the industrial corporations
provision.6 4 Indeed, at the time the Clayton Act was passed, Congress

in all likelihood did not believe it had the ability to regulate banks
since the Supreme Court had held that banks did not do business in
interstate commerce.6 5 The framers of the Clayton Act did not address
horizontal interlocks between banks and nonbanking corporations because at that time there was little competition between banks and non-

banks, 66 because Congress did not foresee situations in which banks
would compete with nonbanking entities such as insurance companies
or retailers, 67 and because of perceived constitutional limitations. It is
for these reasons that a review of the legislative history 68 is

unproductive.
D. Post-1914 Interpretations.
Since the purpose and policy of the Act are vague and its legislative history is inconclusive, it is helpful in determining its meaning to
tion of the debate, calling Mann's objection "purely and entirely technical" and suggesting that
clarity was the purpose behind including the clause. Id. at 16,271.
64. Id. at 16,272. The Crocker court alluded to this insight, characterizing it as a "failure to
anticipate that banks might sometimes compete with nonbanking corporations." 656 F.2d at 445
n.58.
65. See supra note 30.
66. See generally Wallich and Vervel, Evolution in Banking Competition, ECON. REV. FED.
RES. BANK OF RICHMOND 3 (March/April 1981); Light, Increasing Competitionbetween Financial
Institutions, ECON. PERSPECTIVES FED. Ras. BANK OF CHICAGO, 25, 27 (May/June 1977).
As late as 1963, the Supreme Court was still of the opinion that the cluster of products and
services offered by banks composed a distinct line of commerce. United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963). While it was conceded that other entities were in the
business of supplying credit, and therefore "more or less in competition with commercial banks,"
id. at 326 n.5, the prevailing theme was that the cluster of banking products and services is "so
distinctive that [it is] entirely free of effective competition from products or services of other
financial institutions .
" ld.
I. at 356.
67. See supra note 9.
68. In addition to Mann's comments, see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text, the legislative history contains one other reference to bank-nonbank interlocks. In hearings before the
House Committee on the Judiciary during the Clayton Act's initial legislative stage, specific reference was made to bank-insurance company interlocks. Hearingson Trust Legislation Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,63d Cong., 2d Sess. 823, 925 (1914). The emphasis, however, was
not on the competitive relationship between these entities, but rather on an aversion to having
large concerns share directors. "I think there is a grave question as to whether a director in a great
life insurance company should be a director in a bank." Id. at 823 (remark by Mr. Untermyer,
counsel for the Pujo Committee). Such concern was not instigated by competition between banks
and insurance companies, but by the fact that both are a type of "financial" concern and often
have common places of business. Id. at 925 (remark by Louis Brandeis). Competition between
banks and nonbanks was not a consideration.
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examine the way the Act has been interpreted in the past. Although the

courts are, of course, final arbiters of the meaning of a statute, the
Supreme Court has on many occasions been guided by nonjudicial
views. 69 The Crocker court emphasized that reference to the views of a

subsequent Congress is an unsound method of inferring the intent of an
earlier Congress, 70 and therefore dismissed references to congressional
interpretations subsequent to the Clayton Act's passage. 7 1 The court,
in cursorily dismissing the subsequent congressional views, failed to see

the value of these later references. The value is not as an indication of
the Clayton Act Congress' original intent, but rather as interpretations
Act applies to new situations not contemplated by
of how the Clayton
72
that Congress.

The Act has always been interpreted in the past as not applying to
bank-nonbank interlocks. For sixty-five years, Congress and other
governmental bodies have interpreted the Clayton Act as not prohibiting interlocking directorates between a bank and a nonbanking competitor. A 1950 Federal Trade Commission report concluded that
section 8 leaves interlocking directorates between industrial and commercial corporations and financial institutions unchallenged. 73 Various
congressional committees and subcommittees have reached a similar
conclusion. 74 Crocker is the first attack on a bank-nonbank interlock
in sixty years, indicating that the Justice Department apparently did
69. See, ag., Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 47-48 & n. 13 (1977). Of course,
the Court has often ignored such views.
70. 656 F.2d 428, 446, 447.
71. "[O]nly the views of the Congress thdt enacted the Clayton Act are relevant." Id. at 447.
72. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.

73.

THE REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM. ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES,

H.R.

Doc. No. 652, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1950). The government in Crocker claimed that the phrase
"financial institutions" was used throughout the report to refer to both insurance companies and
banks. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 31 n.27. The court of appeals failed to discuss
the government's claim. The context in which this term was used, however, is not consistent with
the government's assertion. In any event, a noninsurance entity competing with a bank would be
exempt from section 8 under the FTC's interpretation.

74. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON INTERLOCKING
DIRECTORATES AMONG THE MAJOR U.S. CORPS. 122 (Comm. Print 1978) (emphasizing the
number of bank-insurance interlocks, not directly commenting on validity); STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH
CONG., IST Sass., CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL BANKS AND INTERLOCKS AMONG FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Comm. Print 1967), reprintedin STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., 2D SEss., I REPORT ON COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES:
EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 921 (Comm. Print 1968) ("the [Clayton Act]
does not apply to interlocks between commercial banks and competing financial institutions, such

as... insurance companies") [hereinafter cited as CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL BANKS]; STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 25, 26 (Comm. Print 1965) ("no prohibi-
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not consider such interlocks a violation of the Clayton Act.75 Finally,
commentators have read section 8 as not prohibiting interlocks between
a banking institution and a business corporation. 76 These explicit and
implicit interpretations of section 8 have led to "widespread reliance on

that the statute does not cover [bank-nonbank]
the assumption
77

interlocks."

A plain reading of the statutory language does not support the
Crocker court's holding that such interlocks are prohibited by the Act.
Neither does the policy of the Act support such a conclusion. The legislative history of the Act is at best inconclusive as to the "other than

banks" provision and its application to bank-nonbank competitor interlocks, and more probably does not address the issue at all since nonbank competitors were not a prominent market force at the time of the

Act's inception. At present, Congress is presumably aware that bankinsurance company interlocks are potentially anticompetitive, and that
regulation or prohibition of these interlocks may be desirable. For the
courts to take action and use section 8 as a means to this regulatory
end, however, is nothing short of judicial revision of the industrial corporation provision.
II.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR ATTACK: THE

FTC

AND

SHERMAN ACTS

The Justice Department chose to prosecute under the Clayton Act
in the Crocker case although the Clayton Act was not the only statute
available. Both the FTC Act 78 and the Sherman Act 79 may apply to
tion in the statute against ... interlocks between banking organizations and other types of
corporations").
75. The Clayton Act was passed in 1914. The government initiated proceedings that resulted
in the Crocker case in 1975. Since 1975, a bank-savings and loan interlock has been attacked, but
not under section 8. See In re Perpetual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608 (1977), vacatedon
other grounds, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979). See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
It is possible, however, that the absence of bank-nonbank competition was responsible for
some of this "hands off" treatment by the Justice Department. But see CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL
BANKS, supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., 16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION §21.03, p. 21-14 (1969 & 1982 Supp.); 2 S. KANwIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 18, 18-3, 18-4 (1979).
77. United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d at 456 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This
widespread reliance is evidenced by the large number of bank-insurance company interlocks. See
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For an application of the FTC Act to interlocks,
see, e.g., In re TRW, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 325 (1979), afl'd, TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.
1981); In re Kraftco Corp., 92 F.T.C. 416 (1978).
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Sherman Act may be used to attack the
interlock as either a restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize. According to one commentator, "section 5 of the FTC Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act, when used in conjunition with

950
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bank-nonbank director interlocks. Shouid the Supreme Court reverse
the Crocker decision, these Acts will be the only available method for
attacking Crocker-type interlocks. An examination of the applicability
of these Acts to cases such as Crocker is worthwhile as use of these Acts
may create several problems.
First, use of either the FTC or Sherman Acts might well have
changed the result in the Crocker case. Although it is not altogether
clear, the standard of review under both Acts when applied to interinterlocks may be rule of reason and not per se; thus, to attack the
interlocks successfully, the government would have to show anticompetitive effects. The difficulty of showing such effects may have been one
reason that the government chose to use the Clayton Act in Crocker.
Second, use of the FTC Act creates jurisdictional problems since banks
are exempt from FTC control. This problem, however, does not appear to be insurmountable.
Both the FTC and Sherman Acts are cumbersome to apply to
bank-nonbank director interlocks because both statutes are of general
applicability while bank-nonbank director interlocks are a comparatively specialized area of concern. The problems with these Acts may
well be a compelling force in persuading Congress to act should the
Supreme Court reverse Crocker.
A. FTCAct andBank-Nonbank Interlocks.
In 1914, President Wilson recommended that a governmental
commission be created to supplement the judicial process in regulating
and controlling business.8 2 The Federal Trade Commission was established following this recommendation to aid the judiciary in controlling
unreasonable practices by investigating and disseminating information
about business conditions.8 3 Section 5 of the FTC Act attempts to
achieve the control of unreasonable business practices by prohibiting
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce .... ,,84 Interlocking directorates were specifically mentioned in the legislative
section 8 of the Clayton Act, form a statutory framework that provides for complete and effective
regulation of all interlocks, no matter what form they take." Note, Interlocking.Directoratesand
Section 8 othe Clayton Act, 44 ALB. L. REV. 139, 160 (1979).
80. See infra notes 96-102 and 110-119 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
82. See 51 CONG. REc. 1978-79 (1914).
83. See generally Kruse, Deconcentration and Section 5 ofthe Federal Trade Commission Act,
46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 200, 211-24 (1978); Note, Section 5 ofthe Federal Trade Commission Act:
4 Source ofFrotection/orCompetitors and Consumers, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 982 (1971).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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history as an example of unfair competition,8 5 and the FTC hias
86
successfully used this provision to attack director interlocks.

1. Applicab&iiy of the FTC Act to Bank-Nonbank Interlocks.
Under section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has the power to suppress as
an unfair method of competition any practice that runs counter to the

public policy of the Clayton Act. 87 The Commission "considers public
values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in
the spirit of the antitrust laws" in determining whether a practice is
deceptive or unfair. 88 Nevertheless, the question of whether section 5
of the FTC Act may reach an interlock that violates the policy of the

Clayton Act, but that technically does not violate section 8, has been
expressly left open by both the Commission and the Ninth Circuit. 89 In
light of the Supreme Court's position that the FTC Act is violated
when conduct conflicts with the basic policy of the Clayton Act, even

though such conduct may not actually violate the Act,90 bank-nonbank
competitor director interlocks should not be excluded from the FTC
Act's coverage merely because technically they do not violate section 8

of the Clayton Act. 91

85. S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
86. See, e.g., In re Claude M. Blair, 96 F.T.C. 184 (1980); In re British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C.
1241 (1975).
87. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
88. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
89. The FTC Act registers all violations of the Clayton and Sherman Acts. See FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953). The administrative law judge
in the first Kraftco proceeding relied on this rule in sidestepping the question whether a court

could, through the FTC Act, reach a director interlock that was not a violation of the Clayton Act.
See In re Kraftco Corp., 89 F.T.C. 46, 58 n.26, rev'd andremandedsub nom. SCM Corp. v. FTC,

565 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 92 F.T.C. 416 (1978) (original order reimposed). The
judge found that a section 8 violation existed, so under the Motion PictureAdvertising Service rule,
section 5 of the FTC Act had also been violated. Id. (citing Motion PictureAdvertising Serv. Co.,

344 U.S. at 394-95).
In the TRW proceedings, both the Commission, 93 F.T.C. at 386 n.22 (1979), and the Ninth
Circuit, 647 F.2d at 945 n.l (9th Cir. 1981), avoided the question; again, because section 8 had
been violated.
90. See, e.g., United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279 n.7
(1975); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357,
369 (1965).
91. Using section 5 of the FTC Act to attack director interlocks is analogous to using section
5 to combat merger activity that might be violative of section 7 of the Clayton Act. It has been
suggested that characterizing these mergers as unfair acts under section 5 would obviate the necessity of showing anticompetitive effects required under section 7. Carstensen & Questal, The Use of
Section 5 of the FederalTrade Commission Act to Attack Large ConglomerateMergers, 63 CoR-

L. REV. 841, 841 (1978). With respect to interlocking directorates, section 5 would obviate
the need for fulfilling the specific requirements of section 8.
NELL
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The obvious impediment to use of section 5 to challenge bank-

nonbank competitor interlocks is that banks are not subject to FTC
jurisdiction.92 In proceedings before the FTC in In rePerpetualFederal
Savings & Loan Association,93 however, section 5 was successfully used

to attack bank-savings and loan director interlocks. The administrative
law judge in Perpetual reasoned that, while banks are exempt from

FTC jurisdiction, the FTC may still challenge any nonexempt corporation with which an exempt firm is interlocked. 94 The directorate interlocks of the exempt firm may thereby be effectively controlled. Thus,
through the use of section 5, the FTC can regulate interlocks between
banks and nonexempt competitors, and thereby circumvent the juris-

dictional limitation by controlling interlocks of corporations within the
95
Commission's jurisdiction.

2. The StandardofReview Under the FTCAct. In Perpetual,the
Commission was able to persuade the administrative law judge to use a
per se standard of review.96 Thus, evidence of an adverse effect on
competition was unnecessary to find those bank-savings and loan interlocks an unfair practice violating section 5. Because the section 5 viola92. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
93. 90 F.T.C. 608 (1977), vacated on other grounds, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979).
In 1968, 56% of savings and loans had interlocks with commercial banks. Herman, Conflict of
Interestin the Savings andLoanIndustry, in 2 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 763,
871 & nA (1969). The FTC recognized the pervasiveness of these interlocks and supported a short
grace period for compliance as an appropriate policy. Federal Trade Commission Statement of
Policy: Interlocking Directorates, 41 Fed. Reg. 35,573, 35,574 (1976).
94. 90 F.T.C. at 638. See Halverson, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust Enforce.
ment Interest Placed in Proper Analytical Perspective, 21 VILL. L. REV. 393, 405 n.60 (1976)
("[T]here is no apparent reason why the FTC could not challenge the director and any nonexempt
commercial corporations with which the exempt firms are interlocked.").
This reasoning also applies to bank-insurance company interlocks such as those found in
Crocker because the FTC has jurisdiction over insurance companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
(Supp. IV 1980).
95. The decision in Perpetualwas vacated, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979), when section 5 of the FTC
Act was amended to exempt savings and loans from FTC jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
(Supp. IV 1980). The reasoning in Perpetualthat allowed section 5 attacks on interlocks between
exempt and nonexempt corporations was not disturbed, however, and remains valid.
Prior to the above amendment, Congress enacted the Depository Institution Management
Interlocks Act (DIMIA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3207 (Supp. IV 1980), which regulates bank-savings
and loan interlocks. Id. § 3202. Concern over interlocks between depository institutions left unregulated by the Clayton Act was one reason for the legislation. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9273, 9286.
In the legislative history of DIMIA, one congressman expressed an interesting opinion relevant to Crocker: "While the bill provides important prohibitions against interlocks among depository institutions, it fails to address the very real problems of interlocks between depository and
nondepository institutions-essentially banks and insurance companies." Id. at 201, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9332 (additional views of Rep. St. Germain).
96. 90 F.T.C. at 657.
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tion was predicated on section 8 of the Clayton Act, a per se statute, 97

the Commission reasoned that the standard of review for the underlyig violation should dictate the standard of review of the FTC Act violation. "Where Section 5 is employed to adopt the policy of aperse
statute, theper se standard remains applicable."9 8

The FTC's invocation of a per se rule of liability for section 5 was
unwarranted in this context for two reasons. First, the Commission improperly relied on the Clayton Act as the underlying basis for the section 5 claim because bank-nonbank interlocks are exempted from
section 8 coverage by the "other than banks" language. Thus the banksavings and loan interlock attacked was not technically a section 8 violation. 99 If the interlock does not fit specifically within section 8 per se
confines, it seems inappropriate to use section 5 to bootstrap a per se
rule of liability onto interlocks that fall outside the reach of section 8.100
Second, the Commission incorrectly relied on the Second Circuit
case of Grand Union Company v. FTC'0 for the proposition that where
section 5 adopts the policy of a per se statute, a per se standard is to be
employed. The court in GrandUnion used a per se rule of liability for
section 5 to reach an "integral part" of a per se violation.10 2 Yet, a
practice that violates an "integral part" of a per se statute is not
synonymous with a practice that "violates the policy" of a per se statute, as an integral part is but a subset of a statute's broader policy.
Perpetual inappropriately expanded the Grand Union reasoning to
graft a per se standard of review onto the section 5 prosecution.
Since the Perpetual decision is incorrect, whether evidence of adverse effects on competition will be necessary in future section 5 attacks
on bank-nonbank competitor interlocks is uncertain.10 3 Assuming that
bank-nonbank competitor interlocks are not covered by section 8 of the
Clayton Act, however, it is illogical to graft a section 8 per se rule of
liability onto section 5 when section 5 is used to attack the interlock.
97. See Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1973).

98. 90 F.T.C. at 657.
99. The bank-savings and loan interlock arguably violated the policy of the Clayton Act. See

supra text accompanying notes 45-57.
100. Cf.90 F.T.C. at 645-48 (Collier, Comn'r, dissenting) (since a factual foundation for inferring public injury is missing and interlock falls outside the section 8 statutory per se rule, case
should be remanded for further proceedings).
101. 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
102. Id. at 99. The underlying violation in Grand Union was of section 2(d) of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1976).
Section 2(d) is a per se statute. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65, 67 n.l1 (1959).
103. Of course, should the Supreme Court affirm Crocker, for all practical purposes the question would be moot.
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Per se status is cautiously granted. 104 Therefore section 5 should not
enjoy the benefit of per se application when it is next used to attack
interlocks falling outside specific statutory prohibitions. Indeed, the
Justice Department and the FTC may have recognized the force of this
reasoning when filing suit in the Crocker case, and may, therefore, have
chosen to use section 8 of the Clayton Act. From a regulator's view-

point, then, section 8 is a more economical tool than section 5 of the
FTC Act since section 8 avoids the difficult showing of anticompetitive
effects. 105
104. The Supreme Court recently spoke to the granting of per se status, stating that "the established position [is] that a newper se rule is not justified until the judiciary obtains considerable
rule of reason experience with the particular type of restraint challenged." Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soe'y, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 2476 n.19 (1982). With virtually no case law outside of the
statutorily per se section 8 of the Clayton Act, the granting of per se status when other provisions
are used to attack interlocks is highly unlikely. The Court has spoken more specifically to the use
of a per se standard of review:
Perse rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility
of particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitive consequences
will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced
against its procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may
arise, but aperse rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common
or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them. Once established,perse rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize
the burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials, but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation ofper se
rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus
introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law.
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) (citations omitted).
105. Using section 8 also avoids problems with the bank exemption to the FTC Act. See supra
notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
Regulating bank-nonbank competitor interlocks through the FTC Act raises McCarran-Ferguson Act issues, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the McCarranFerguson Act would have precluded application of the FTC Act in Crocker. The district court
and court of appeals agreed that the interlock was not excluded from the Clayton Act by the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption. See 422 F. Supp. at 706; 656 F.2d at 452.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in response to the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), that the business of insurance could be interstate commerce and thereby subject to the commerce clause power of Congress.
Previously, it had been assumed that the issuance of insurance policies across state lines was not
interstate commerce, see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), and that the antitrust laws
were inapplicable to insurers. The Act placed a moratorium on the application of the antitrust
laws to the insurance industry. See Reply Brief and Brief in Response for the United States at 35,
United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub noan.
Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 2294 (1982).
The McCarran-Ferguson Act allows federal regulation of the "business of insurance" only to
the extent that it is not regulated by the states. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). The Sherman Act,
Clayton Act, and FTC Act are similarly restricted in application to insurance companies. "[The
three acts] shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law." Id. The Crocker court found that the law of neither New York nor New
Jersey (the home states of the challenged banks and insurance companies involved) regulated
bank-insurance company interlocks. 656 F.2d at 453.
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The Sherman Act and Bank-Nonbank Interlocks.
Interlocking directorates may be attacked under sections 1 and 3

of the Sherman Act, which prohibit contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, 10 6 and under section 2 of the Act, which
prohibits monopolies and attempts to monopolize. 0 7 Government antitrust actions under the Sherman Act terminated by consent decrees

including prohibitions on interlocks between competing corporations,
are evidence of the potential success of this strategy. 0 8 Additionally,

the Sherman Act does not encounter the jurisdictional problems of
FTC Act application to bank-nonbank interlocks.109
Whether the standard of review for an action brought under the

Sherman Act makes bank-nonbank competitor interlocks per se illegal
or necessitates the showing of anticompetitive effects is uncertain. This

specific question has not been addressed by the courts. Although the
Crocker court stated that interlocks are per se illegal under the SherEven if insurance company interlocks are regulated by state law, however, the Act does not
apply if the selection of directors is not considered "the business of insurance." The Supreme
Court significantly narrowed the definition of "the business of insurance" in Group Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). See Note, The Defnition of "Business of Insurance" Under the McCarran-FergusonAct After Royal Drug, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1479-81

(1980). The Court clarified its holding in Royal Drug in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102
S.Ct. 3002 (1982), identifying three criteria relevant in determining what is the business of insurance: "JTFTirst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry."
Id at 3009.
In competing with banks or sharing directors, insurance companies are not engaging in the
"business of insurance" as defined in Royal Drug and Pireno. Thus, it seems doubtful that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act would ever preclude application of the FTC Act (or the Sherman or
Clayton Acts) in any interlocking directorate case involving a bank and an insurance company.
Cf. In re John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.T.C. 383 (1978) (use of FTC Act to regulate
interlocking directorates among insurance companies; consent order filed).
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1976).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
McCarran-Ferguson questions will also arise if the Sherman Act is used to challenge bankinsurance company competitor interlocks, because the McCarran-Ferguson Act restricts the application of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). The identical analysis included in the
discussion of the FTC Act applies in Sherman Act cases, see supra note 105; thus, the McCarranFerguson Act exemption does not prohibit the regulation of bank-insurance company interlocks
through sections 1, 2, or 3 of the Sherman Act.
108. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp.; 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,624 (E.D.
Mich. 1965); United States v. True Temper Corp., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,441 (N.D. Ill.
1959); United States v. Linen Supply Inst., 1958 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,120 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
United States v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,850 (D. Mass. 1957).
109. Sherman Act decrees have also extended the interlock prohibition to officers, agents, and
employees. See cases cited supra note 108.
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man Act, 110 the authority cited by the court supports per se illegality for
director interlocks under the Clayton Act, not the Sherman Act."I l Additionally, courts have not applied a per se standard under the Sherman Act when reviewing interlocks. 112 Thus, the Crocker court's
interpretation of the Sherman Act standard of review is unsupported by
case law.
The prevailing standard of review under the Sherman Act is a
"rule of reason." 113 This standard requires the factfinder to weigh all
the circumstances of a case to determine whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as an unreasonable restraint on trade. 114 Only
plainly anticompetitive activities are per se illegal under the Sherman
Act. 115 When the Supreme Court enumerated per se violations of the
Sherman Act in White Motor Co. v. UnitedStates,11 6 it did not include
interlocking directorates in that list. 17
110. "Interlocking arrangements between competing corporations threaten the basic purpose
of the Sherman Act and are therefore treated as illegalper se." United States v. Crocker Nat'l
Corp., 656 F.2d at 438 (dictum).
111. The court cited TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 1981) and United States v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) in support of its assertion of per
se illegality. In TRWthe court discussed section 8 of the Clayton Act and concluded that proof of
actual anticompetitive effect is not required. 647 F.2d at 947. In Sears the court observed that an
agreement to fix prices between competitors would be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Ill
F. Supp. at 616. But any per se rule as applied to interlocking directorates is mentioned only in
connection with section 8 of the Clayton Act. See id. at 616-17.
112. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
113. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (citing Standard Oil
Co. v. Ufiited States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
114. The classic statement of the rule of reason was made by Mr. Justice Brandeis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This
is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
115. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). If
the practice appears to be one that always or almost always tends to restrict competition and
decrease output, it will receive per se treatment. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1979).
116. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
117. The list of per se violations of the Sherman Act consisted of four items: 1) sale of unpatented products tied to patented article; 2) agreement between competitors to divide markets; 3)
group boycotts; and 4) horizontal and vertical price-fixing arrangements. Id. at 259-60.
This list of per se Sherman Act violations was not expressly exclusive. The Court, however,
viewed the law in these areas as so well developed that the anticompetitive effects could be assumed without the necessity of proof. The law surrounding director interlocks and the Sherman
Act is not well developed. Interlocks do not share characteristics with the per se violations the
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Exchange of competitive information may be per se illegal under
the Sherman Act." 8 But while the interlocking directorate may increase the possibility of such an exchange,"l 9 only that activity, and not

the underlying interlock, should be given Sherman Act per se treatment. Unless an interlock is demonstrably part of a more general plan

that is per se violative of the Sherman Act, evidence of an anticompetitive effect from the interlock should be required to establish a Sherman

Act violation.
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC
Act may be used against bank-nonbank competitor interlocks. Unlike

section 8 of the Clayton Act, however, the FTC Act encounters jurisdictional problems, and both the Sherman and FTC Acts may require

evidence of anticompetitive effects to establish a violation. In light of
these differing standards of review, use of the Clayton Act to challenge
bank-nonbank interlocks could change the result in many cases because of the difficulty of showing anticompetitive effects. Should the
Supreme Court overturn Crocker, these problems would be of immediate concern.
III.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Even if the Supreme Court affirms Crocker, legislation crafted specifically to deal with the relationships between various types of
financial institutions and bank-nonbank competitor interlocks should
be enacted 20 since Crocker prohibits a practice previously thought exSupreme Court enumerated and therefore should not be accorded per se status. See supra note
104.
118. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969). But see United
States v. Citizens and S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975).
119. In re Perpetual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608, 623 (1977), vacated on other
grounds, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979).
120. Congress should take action to clarify, at least, section 8 of the Clayton Act. The efficacy
of section 8 of the Clayton Act as a regulatory tool to prohibit interlocks has been questioned by
commentators. See, e.g., Jacobs, Interlocks, 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 204, 207 (1965);
Kramer, Interlocking Directorshipsand the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 1266, 1274
(1950). In the words of a vigorous proponent of more comprehensive legislation, section 8 "is as
110
full of holes as swiss cheese. Its shortcomings have been highlighted again and again.
CONG. REc. 5767 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
This situation has not gone unnoticed, and there have been several congressional attempts to
strengthen the Clayton Act by passing legislation to bar bank-nonbank interlocks. See United
States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d at 446 & n.61. At least one of these proposed bills would
have specifically prohibited bank-insurance company interlocks. The Banking ReformAct of 1971:
Hearings Before the Comnm on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 1-9 (1971). As of yet, however, these attempts have failed, and the government has been
reluctant to use the Act. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING AND
MANAGEMENT OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG THE MAJOR U.S. CORPS. (Comm. Print 1978) (the nearly
1000 page report is comprised primarily of printouts of individual director affiliations and corpo-
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empt 12t from the Clayton Act. Should the Supreme Court overturn
Crocker, for reasons noted in the foregoing discussion on the use of the
Sherman and FTC Acts, a legislative response is similarly desirable.
Because of the recent innovations in financial markets, 2 2 the Clayton
Act, the FTC Act, and the Sherman Act are ill-equipped to deal with
bank-nonbank director interlocks as none of the Acts are attuned to the
specific considerations of bank-nonbank relationships. Such relationships may well result in anticompetitive market effects. The reversal of
Crocker by the Supreme Court would be a signal to Congress of the
need for legislation dealing with bank-nonbank competitor interlocks.
Dean H. Blhe

rate board compositions, and is a testament to the massive number of interlocking directorates in
corporate America).
As one commentator has noted concerning government reluctance to prosecute under section
8, "the Government's attack on corporate interlocks under the antitrust laws has been conducted
with all the observable success and fervor that attended the major campaigns of the Italian army
during World War II." Travers, supra note 14, at 822.
121. An analogous situation confronted Congress in 1978. A decision had been rendered the
previous year declaring bank-savings and loan interlocks illegal. In re Perpetual Fed. Savings &
Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608 (1977), vacatedon othergrounds, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979). These interlocks
had been regarded as legal, as attested to by the pervasiveness of the relationships. See Supra note
93. Congress responded through a two step process. First, it passed the Depository Institution
Management Interlocks Act (DIMIA), an intricate piece of legislation specifically attuned to and
regulating bank-savings and loan interlocks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-07 (Supp. IV 1980). Again, a
similar act could be tailored to the specific needs of the bank-nonbank area. DIMIA also granted
banks and savings and loans a ten year period for compliance. Id § 3205. Congress provided this
transition period to ease the upheavals resulting from the change in directorates mandated by the
Act. A similar congressional response in the bank-nonbank area is desirable.
122. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.

